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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
L E S T E R E. CANNON and 
M A R G A R E T CANNON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
vs. 
ORVAL W R I G H T , 
Defendant and Respondent. J 
Case No. 
13746 
B R I E F O F R E S P O N D E N T 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This was an action to recover the amount due on 
a promissory note, together with costs and attorney's 
fees on the part of the plaintiffs and a counter-claim 
on the part of the Defendant to recover the value of an 
air compressor. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
This case was tried before the Honorable A. John 
Ruggeri, sitting without a jury. The trial court entered 
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a judgment against the plaintiffs dismissing the com-
plaint with prejudice, and a judgment of a like nature 
against the defendant's Counter-claim. The plaintiffs 
moved for new tiral and that motion was overruled and 
denied. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the trial 
court affirmed. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On April 16, 1963, Lester and Margaret Cannon 
became involved in a corporation known as Kolob Acres. 
They subsequently acquired sixty-six and two-thirds 
percent of the shares of Kolob Corporation and Orval 
Wright acquired thirty-three and one-third percent of 
the shares of that corporation. (TR. 11). Mr. Cannon 
was represented by an attorney from Las Vegas, 
Nevada, who was later the attorney for Kolob Acres. 
This attorney, Mr. Nitz, defended a condemnation suit 
where approximately $45,000.00 was placed in a trust 
account for Kolob Acres. (TR. 15). The condemnation 
suit was brought by the federal government on certain 
real property owned by Kolob Acres for the purpose 
of taking said real property. (TR. 17). 
The federal government contended there was not 
enough water on the condemned property for subdivision 
purposes and the corporation thereafter loaned Orval 
Wright $6,000.00 pursuant to the promissory note con-
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cerned with here to develop said water rights so that 
the property would be more valuable when condemned. 
(TR. 17&18). 
Pursuant to that loan Orval Wright was asked 
by the attorney, Nitz, to sign a promissory note. Nitz 
was attorney for Cannon and his wife who owned two-
thirds of the corporation at that time. (TR. 11,14). The 
promissory note was undated, (TR. 53), to be paid from 
the settlement of the lawsuit, Civil No. 114063 and 
prepared by Cannon's attorney. 
Orval Wright testified on page 23 of the transcript 
of trial, line 3 : 
Q. Mr. Wright, do you know whether you paid the 
note off when the monies were dispersed from the final 
fund due and owing Kolob Acres Corporation? 
A. When I left that money, everything was sup-
posed to be paid. There was nothing outstanding I knew 
about. 
Lester Cannon testified on page 32 of the tran-
script: 
Q. So you don't know whether you got the 
$6,000.00 from Orval Wright at that time, do you? 
A. Well, I know that Orval Wright paid me my 
$6,000.00. I didn't issue—attach his part of that trust 
account. I didn't attach that. I don't know what was 
done with his trust account. 
Lester Cannon also testified on page 30 of the 
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transcript that Orval Wright did not pay him back, but 
that he didn't know how much money he got from the 
settlement or what it was for. 
Thereafter Lester E . Cannon and Margaret Can-
non divorced. The ex-wife of Lester Cannon, Margaret 
Cannon, gave a release of said promissory note to the 
defendant, Orval Wright. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT E R R 
I N D E T E R M I N I N G T H E P R O M I S -
SORY N O T E W A S C O N D I T I O N A L . 
The Uniform Commercial Code, Section 70A-3-105 
sets forth the law applicable in the instant case: 
# # # 
(2) A promissory or order is not uncondi-
tional if the instrument 
(a) states that it is subject to or governed 
by any other agreement; or 
(b) states that it is to be paid only out of a 
particular fund or source except as pro-
vided in this section. 
The promissory note in this case provides that the 
$6,000.00 is to be paid: 
". . . on the day payment is received by the 
undersigned from the United States govern-
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ment in settlement of Civil Action No. C-114-
63 in the United States District Court of the 
State of Utah, Central Division, and under-
signed does hereby assign to payees as security 
for this (over) note the sum of $6,000.00 from 
any settlement paid the undersigned as a re-
sult of said Civil Action No. C-114-63." 
Mr. Cannon and his attorney received an initial 
payment of $45,000.00 and later received final settle-
ment in Civil Action No. C-114-63. That same attorney 
represented the majority stockholders (Lester E. Can-
non and Margaret Cannon) and subsequently distri-
buted monies available from the condemnation action. 
Orval Wright testified at trial that all obligations 
owed by him were paid out of the settlement of Civil 
Action No. C-114-63. (TR. 23). Lester Cannon testi-
fied he didn't know if he received $6,000.00 from the 
settlement of said Civil Action No. C-114-63. (TR. 32). 
Plaintiff contends the promissory note was signed 
in March of 1964 and the testimony at trial was clear 
on the point that final settlement was made sometime 
in 1965 and that Mr. Cannon did not make demand for 
payment on this promissory note until this lawsuit was 
commenced on December 20,1969. 
Since Mr. Nitz was handling the matters in and 
for Kolob Acres the plaintiff was well aware that the 
distribution monies was to be handled by Mr. Nitz. 
Nitz was aware of the note and aware of payment due 
Mr. Cannon in the settlement of Civil Action No. C-114-
63. Therefore, plaintiff's contention that money from 
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the expected settlement was only "security not personal 
obligation of the defendant" is without reason. The in-
tention of both parties is clearly shown by the language 
of the note. The language of the note in this case clearly 
makes the promise or order conditional as set forth in 
Section 70A-3-105 above, as there are no exceptions 
under this Section which are applicable to the instant 
case. 
This court is well aware that under the usual rule 
of review the evidence will be surveyed in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings and judgment. 
Buehner Block v. Glezos, 6 U.2d 226, 310 P.2d 517 
(1957). The facts here unequivocably point to a writing 
or promissory note based upon a condition which must 
have been performed before the note was valid. The 
facts further show that the plaintiffs were in position 
at all times to direct the attorney, Nitz, when making 
the settlement as the plaintiffs were the majority stock-
holders in Kolob Acres. Therefore, since the note was 
conditioned and the plaintiff held the key to the perform-
ing of the conditions, then the plaintiffs should have 
been paid in accordance with the actions initiated by 
themselves. 
The Supreme Court ruled on a similar issue in the 
case of Skousen v. Smith, 27 U.2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 
(1972). In that case the note stated as follows : 
" I t is agreed that the drawer of this note 
shall not be liable hereunder until and unless 
payment is received from . . . Walker on notes 
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executed by him in the total sum of $13,-
977.70." 
The Court then stated: 
"We think the nub of this case is whether 
the note, subject to this action, became due 
and payable when Mr. Smith received a $2,-
500.00 payment from Walker. The trial court 
held that it did and we are constrained too, 
and do agree." 
The defendant in this case contended that the 
promissory note was conditioned on a payment of $13,-
977.70 from Walker. 
Walker did pay $2,500.00 but had not paid the 
remainder and the defendant insisted that the note did 
not become due because Smith received a $2,500.00 
payment from Walker and paid none of this to the de-
fendant Skousen. 
The Court stated that the document meant what 
it said and was conditioned upon certain payments being 
made and that the parties were bound by the language 
they deliberately used in their contract, irrespective of 
the fact that it might result in improvidence. 
In the instant case the parties contracted for pay-
ment of a certain promissory note by defendant to plain-
tiff when certain conditions arose. The trial court found 
that the parties were bound by the terms of this promis-
sory note and the Skousen case agrees with this inter-
pretation. 
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P O I N T I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT E R R 
I N D E T E R M I N I N G T H A T B O T H 
P A R T I E S TO T H E P R O M I S S O R Y 
N O T E W E R E BOUND B Y T H E D I S -
T R I B U T I O N A N D S E T T L E M E N T I N 
CIVIL CASE NO. C-114-63. 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code cited in 
Point I and the Skousen case, the law in the State of 
Utah is that a promissory note can be conditional and 
the promissory note in the instant case is conditional 
because both parties agreed to the writing set forth on 
the promissory note and there was no testimony at the 
trial otherwise. 
The trial court found that the plaintiffs were 
parties to the distribution and settlement and were bound 
by said distribution and settlement. 
Apparently the Court realized that the plaintiffs 
were the majority stockholders in Kolob Acres and 
that plaintiffs hired the attorney who represented Kolob 
Acres in the condemnation action and said plaintiffs also 
had their attorney hold the initial money in trust and 
also the final payment and thereafter distributed said 
money. 
The defendant testified that he simply took the 
money that was given to him by the plaintiff's attorney. 
Since the note was conditional and plaintiff's made 
distribution through their attorney, the trial court sim-
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ply found that the plaintiffs should have exercised what-
ever conditions applied to said promissory note at the 
time of settlement and as far as the transcript or trial 
goes, it may be that plaintiff was paid at that time, as 
the plaintiff, Lester Cannon, did not specifically testify 
that he did not receive his $6,000.00 from the setlement. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT E R R 
I N F I N D I N G T H A T T H E P L A I N -
T I F F , M A R G A R E T CANNON, N O W 
K N O W N AS M A R G A R E T S U L L I N S , 
GAVE A F U L L R E L E A S E TO T H E 
D E F E N D A N T , ORVAL W R I G H T , 
F O R A L L D E B T S , P A S T A N D 
P R E S E N T . 
The promissory note in this case was made payable 
to Lester E. Cannon and Margaret Cannon, and/or 
order. 
Such a note is governed by Section 70A-3-110, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953): 
70A-3-110. Payable to order. - - (1) An 
instrument is payable to order when by its 
terms it is payable to the order or assigns 
of any person therein specified with reasonable 
certainty, or to him or his order, or when it 
is conspicuously designated on its face as "ex-
change" or the like and names a payee. I t is 
payable to the order of 
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(a) the maker or drawer; or 
(b) the drawee; or 
(c) a payee who is not maker, drawer or 
drawee; or 
(d) two or more payees together or in the 
alternative; or 
(e) an estate, trust or fund, in which case 
it is payable to the order of the represen-
tative of such estate, trust or fund or his 
successors; or 
(f) an office, or an officer by his title as 
such in which case it is payable principal 
but the incumbent of the office or his 
successors may act as if he or they were 
the holder; or 
(g) a partnership or unincorporated associa-
tion, in which case it is payable to the 
partnership or association and may be in-
dorsed or transferred by any person there-
to authorized. 
In this case the promissory note was made payable 
to Lester E . Cannon and Margaret Cannon and/or 
order, and under Section 70A-3-110 the note is made 
payable to order because it is payable to plaintiffs or 
their order. Because the note is made payable to order, 
then under 70A-3-110(d) it is payable to the order of 
two or more payees together or in the alternative. 
Under this Section the note is payable, in the al-
ternative, to Margaret Cannon, also known as Margaret 
Cannon Sullins. 
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I t would appear that the plaintiff, Lester Cannon, 
got all that he deserved out of the settlement which was 
a condition of promissory note for the reason that Mar-
garet Cannon felt that she gained her just due under 
the promissory note and gave a release of said note. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff, Lester Cannon, testified that he did not 
receive the $6,000.00 and he also testified that he did 
receive it. 
Plaintiff, Margaret Cannon gave a complete re-
lease indicating that the note was paid. The note was 
conditional and Lester Cannon, through his attorney was 
in charge of initiating the conditions. 
Therefore, it appears that the trial court found the 
evidence did not preponderate in favor of plaintiffs and 
the Complaint and Counterclaim were dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M I C H A E L W. PARK, Esq. 
99 North Main Street 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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